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Michael LoCicero. A Midnight Massacre: The Night Operation on 
the Passchendaele Ridge, 2 December 1917: The Forgotten Last Act 
of the Third Battle of Ypres. Solihull, UK: Helion & Company, 2014. 
Pp. 517.
It may come as a surprise to many readers that the Canadian attack 
at Passchendaele on 10 November 1917 was not the culmination of 
the long lamentable Third Ypres campaign. Nor did the 1st Division 
gain “complete observation over the German positions to the north-
east” on the ridge.1 Instead, as Michael LoCicero’s Midnight Massacre 
describes, there was one further attempt by the British to seize the 
remaining high points on the ridge on the night of 1/2 December 
1917. Overshadowed by the far more momentous Battle of Cambrai, 
this engagement did not merit a battle honour and fell outside the 
official dates of Third Ypres. Carried out by one brigade each of the 
8th and 32nd Divisions for a total of seven battalions, the attack 
featured a night assault without a rolling barrage for its first eight 
minutes to surprise the defenders. Despite the undoubted courage of 
the troops, the attack was, as one battalion commander called it, a 
“bad show” (p. xxvii). LoCicero has the ambitious aim of providing 
an “in-depth account with a considered attempt to mesh the detailed 
narrative with rigorous academic inquiry” (p. xxix). By limiting the 
bounds of time and space of his study, he delves into a level of detail 
that campaign accounts or unit narratives cannot investigate. As a 
result, he covers the battle procedure and execution from the highest 
command levels to the actions of individual platoons. The book is 
the result of a ten-year research project into the battle and is based 
on his PhD dissertation from the University of Birmingham. The 
work is solidly situated in the revisionist school that has moved 
beyond the ‘bloody fools’ view, and assesses the situation based on 
the evidence instead of emotion. The result is a unique study which 
is exhaustively researched, lavishly illustrated, and extensively 
footnoted. It is a dense work that will appeal to academics and those 
interested in the mechanics of how the British planned and carried 
out operations.
The book seeks to answer two crucial research questions: why 
another attack was necessary and was it more than just a futile effort. 
1  G.W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919 (Montreal and 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015), 325-6.
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The author casts a wide net in his research efforts. He consulted a 
broad variety of official documents, personal diaries and letters of 
participants at all levels, as well as the latest specialist academic 
research. LoCicero also usefully includes the German perspective 
from the Munich archives and regimental histories. This research is 
apparent in the text and the extensive footnotes on each page, which 
saves the reader from having to hunt down references at the back 
of the book. He makes good use of field messages to help the reader 
recognise both what the commanders understood the situation to be 
and how it actually was. This helps in comprehending the reasoning 
behind decisions. He also takes the time to sketch the background, 
character, and circumstances of the participants at all levels and how 
these impacted the operation.
The book comprises six chapters, twenty-one appendices, and 
thirty-five pages of introductory material. Chapter One introduces 
the battle’s background, its conception, the defenders, and 
commanders. The next goes into depth into the formal operational 
orders issued by the two corps involved and by each level down 
to the battalions. Chapter Three describes what transpired on the 
night of 1/2 December and the relative success and failure of the 
units. Continuing discussion of the battle, the fourth chapter presents 
the ongoing action during the daylight hours of 2 December as the 
British commanders tried to understand what occurred and possibly 
redeem the failures. The penultimate chapter narrates and analyses 
the German reaction to the attack, the decision to shut down further 
operations, and how the participants analysed the outcome and 
derived lessons. The final chapter reviews the operational, strategic, 
and political consequences of the battle, its costs, and its memory. 
Appendices cover the operational orders issued by all levels of 
command, the order of battle, and published German accounts of 
the battle and other aspects of the action. Numerous illustrations of 
the ground, terrain, conditions, people mentioned in the text, and 
contemporary British and German trench maps enliven and inform 
the text. The extensive quotations from orders that would have been 
better suited to notes or an appendix result in a stylistic issue. They 
tend to bog down the narrative and make the text less accessible to 
the casual reader.
LoCicero describes the reason for the plan as stemming from 
the twin motives of lessening the major risks of holding a narrow 
salient and improving the starting point for a renewed offensive in 
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the spring.2 At its heart, the book examines how the commanders 
tried to square the circle of attacking out of a narrow salient with 
an unfavourable artillery situation. A further complication was that 
the attack occurred at the boundary between two divisions from 
separate corps, both at the end of a shaky line of communications. 
The driving force in the attack’s concept was the commander of the 
32nd Division, Major-General C.D. Shute, who had to find a solution 
to two critical issues. First, owing to the unfavourable field conditions, 
his supporting artillery had to be deployed parallel to the axis of 
advance rather than the usual perpendicular arrangement. This 
made firing an accurate barrage across the attack front exceedingly 
difficult. Second, the attackers had to cross no-man’s-land before 
the German counter barrage came crashing down. In the glutinous 
mud, the troops would move too slowly and so be subject to heavy 
German shelling. Shute’s solution, imposed on the 8th Division, was 
to forgo the standard rolling barrage for the first eight minutes in 
a night moonlight attack. This would allow assault troops time to 
capture the German forward zone and escape the counter barrage. 
He thought moonlight was necessary to allow troops to assemble 
correctly and advance in the proper direction. The threat of shelling 
concerned him more than the risk of rifle and machine gun fire. As 
LoCicero describes, he was wrong. It would be easy to paint a picture 
of Shute as a British ‘Donkey,’ but the author has taken the time to 
explain his motivations, the constraints that shaped his plan, and 
how the travails of communications limited the exercise of command. 
The author also highlights the challenges that exist when attacks 
occur at formation boundaries, and how the importance of the main 
effort negated the common-sense objections of experienced officers. 
Recognising that, by 1917, British attacks were the combination of 
multiple arms, LoCicero covers the vital aspects of logistics, medical 
care, communications, artillery, and machine guns, and their effect 
on the battle. Given Shute’s fretting about artillery, the one major 
complaint about the book is that LoCicero should have provided more 
context on the situation of both the British and German guns and 
how the British lost artillery superiority. 
The battle turned out as some commanders expected, with the 
German infantry responding quickly to the attack and their rifle 
and machine gun fire inflicting losses and disorganisation. British 
2  The British Expeditionary Force had not yet shifted to a purely defensive posture.
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attackers reached their first objectives but at the cost of serious 
disorder and the loss of many of their crucial leaders, such that 
they were ripe for a counterattack. The recapture of a key pillbox 
hours before the attack at the junction of the 8th and 32nd Divisions 
disrupted both formations’ assault and added to the confusion and 
misunderstandings. In the end, the British made only a minor advance 
and did not improve their position on the ridge.
The author achieves his goal of delivering a full appreciation of 
an operation, its execution and its consequences from the highest 
command levels down to individuals. It provides the reader with a 
comprehensive understanding of the British art of war on the Western 
Front circa December 1917. The work shows battle procedures, the 
execution of a plan, and the outcomes of a small operation that, while 
not noteworthy in the overall scale of the war, illustrates the British 
art of war and how it had evolved by December 1917. The small scope 
allows both reader and writer to understand a complex but tightly 
constrained situation that is illustrative of the larger picture.
william f. stewart, independent researcher
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